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Oct., 1953
PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE-
SHOULD IT BE ABOLISHED IN COLORADO?
ROBERT D. CHARLTON
of the Denver Bar
Prior to the adoption by our Supreme Court of the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure (adopted January 6, 1941, effective April
6, 1941, see Volume 107, Colorado Reports following page 442 and
Rule 1 C (b)) much use of Rule 16 (pre-trial procedures; formu-
lating issues) was predicted.
However, Percy Morris, Esquire, in his address No. 5 Appen-
dix D, page 463, stated:
This rule prescribes an innovation in our practice
which, if put into effect by the judges and wisely admin-
istered by them, will prove to be one of the most beneficial
changes in procedure made by the rules. (Italics mine).
Much has been written and spoken by eminent and distin-
guished individuals about the benefits to be derived from its
effectual use. The late Judge J. Foster Symes of our Federal Dis-
trict Court, who was an ardent advocate and skilful user of the
procedure set up in the rule, made the most apt statement of its
objective and its benefits when he said in his article in Dicta of
May 1950 at page 463:
It (Pre-trial Procedure) will not succeed unless the
court is sympathetic with the new procedure, insists upon
its use and insists further, that the bar take it seriously.
And at page 164:
Its obvious advantage is the saving of time for liti-
gants, counsel, and the court-by a frank discussion of the
law and facts in chambers after a case is at issue and
before trial. Each side is compelled to disclose witnesses,
what they will testify to, the legal theory upon which they
will proceed, and the legal points that will be raised in
the trial of the case which can be settled before trial.
These matters are discussed, and if the court wishes, it
can decide questions of law before the case goes to trial,
if a trial is necessary. In this way all elements of sur-
prise are taken out of the case, and the issues are simpli-
fied so that they are thoroughly understood by the court
and jury. It prevents a law suit from being a contest
between counsel rather than between parties. Many law-
yers object to this as they are fond of keeping their facts
a secret, springing a question of law, etc., at the trial
and taking the other side by surprise.
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Furthermore, when lawyers and litigants learn of
the other side's case by the use of pre-trial procedure,
they are not quite so sure of the strength of their own
position and are willing to talk compromise and settle-
ment. My experience has been that many clients do not
make a full disclosure of the case to their counsel and
only tell him the facts favorable to their contentions.
They, as well as their counsel, are often surprised to learn
at pre-trial of the strength of their opponent's case. This
makes them more reasonable and willing to talk compro-
mise when they learn there is a question as to the cor-
rectness of their position.
It is not my intention to decry, or reflect adversely, upon this
rule as we I are firm believers in its usefulness and are strong
advocates of the merits of the procedure set up in the rule. Nor do
I intend to try and report the attitudes of various lawyers, trial
judges, etc. with regard to the way the Rule is handled and prac-
ticed. T. Raber Taylor, Esquire, in his splendid article in Dicta,
May 1950, pages 157-163 has made a report of its use in the various
district courts up to that time. I have made no attempt to gather
any additional statistics from trial courts nor am I going to in-
dulge in reporting any personal experiences in the trial courts.
I do, however, propose to indicate the fate that has attended
the rule as reported by our own Supreme Court decisions. For,
after all, the approval or disapproval of this Rule by our court
of last resort has determined whether or not the Rule will be
vigorously used by trial judges or land in the limbo of discarded
judicial junk.
When Mr. Morris made the statement referred to above, it
seemed to be his view that the success or failure depended upon
the trial judges, because in a later paragraph at page 464 he said:
Whether the pre-trial procedure is to be put into
practice at all is dependent entirely upon the trial court.
And the effectiveness of the practice, when put into effect,
will depend both upon the manner in which the judge
handles the conference and upon the attitude adopted by
the attorneys.
This statement of course is a splendid statement, because by
the terms of the rule, the trial judge has discretion in putting the
rule into effect, but in the final .analysis the limits of approval or
disapproval of the actions of trial courts and their orders made
during the conference are ultimately set by the supreme court.
They are the "Judges" who have the ultimate responsibility, and,
perhaps their approval was taken for granted.
I Kenneth W. Robinson of the Denver Bar and myself.
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According to Volume 107, at the time of the adoption of the
Rule, the court was composed of the following individuals:







It would appear from the proceedings that the adoption of
the rules was unanimous by the court.
The construction to be placed upon the rules is set forth in
plain, vigorous and unmistakable terms:
* . . They shall be liberally construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action.
Rule 1 C (a) Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure.
In Berryman v. Berryman,2 decided August 21, 1946, the
court, speaking through Mr. Justice Stone, in reversing the trial
court for sustaining a motion to dismiss a complaint in an action
for insufficient facts to state a claim in a case where a husband
set forth the usual allegations for divorce, but prayed for a limited
divorce (judicial separation), equitable division of property, and
"such other and further relief, etc." said at page 284:
Our new rules of civil procedure, adopted almost in
their entirety from the new federal rules, are intended
to simplify pleadings and to eliminate delay, . . . 'If wisely
administered, the Rules should do much to eliminate the
complaints of laymen and of lawyers alike as to the tech-
nicalities of the law, the subtleties of practice, and the
involvements of procedure. Their object must at all times
control-"to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive de-
termination of every action." '
And at page 286 at the end of the opinion:
Rules of procedure should serve to facilitate, not to
impede, the decision of cases on their merits.
This opinion, however, was not unanimous. Mr. Justice
Hilliard did not participate. Mr. Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice
Burke dissented and the ground for dissent by them is not stated.
Inasmuch as they were on the court at the time of the adoption, it
is assumed that their dissent was based on the legal question as to
whether or not the complaint in fact stated "a cause of action",
2 115 Colo. 281, 172 P. (2d) 446.
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and thus did not militate against the announced spirit of the rules
set forth in the opinion and in the rules themselves.
This decision appeared for a time to be a hopeful augury of
the future of the Rules in general, and particular rules from time
to time, as they had occasion to be scrutinized by our Supreme
Court in connection with cases brought to it for review.
In McKinley v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad
Company,3 a damage action, arising out of a shipment of sheep
from Presidio, Texas, to Mosca, Colorado, the defendant's line
having been the terminal carrier and in which the plaintiff suf-
fered a directed verdict against him for failure to make out a case,
the Supreme Court said at page 207:
When the specific acts of negligence upon which
plaintiff relies are declared by him, whether in his com-
plaint or at pre-trial conference or in any other manner,
it is the general rule that he is restricted thereby. He
must maintain this cause, if at all, by proof of the negli-
gence so charged. No reason of surprise or excusable neg-
ligence appears to justify an exception here to the general
rule. (italics mine).
Although no claim of error was apparently made challenging
the pre-trial conference or any part of it in this case, nevertheless,
the opinion of our Supreme Court indicated some emphasis on the
proceedings at the pre-trial conference.
Nowithstanding these hopeful signs and on January 23, 1950,
the outlook changed. On that day Duffy v. Gross 4 wes decided.
This case was referred to in T. Raber Taylor's article and is well
briefed there.
Three years have now passed and Duffy v. Gross may well have
been either, for all practical purposes, the death knell of pre-trial
procedure in Colorado, or at least a postponement for some time
to come of its adequate and intended use. The composition of
the court was Benjamin C. Hilliard, Chief Justice, William S.
Jackson, Mortimer Stone, Frank L. Hays, Wilbur M. Alter, E. V.
Holland, and 0. Otto Moore. It seems to have been unanimous as
no dissent is noted. It can be seen, of course, from this roster
that the only Judge remaining on the court among those who
adopted the Rules was the then Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard. This
was an automobile accident case. The testimony was extensively
reviewed by the court. The presence or absence of a stop sign at
the collision intersection was a disputed question. The plaintiff
having recovered judgment, the defendant sought review, alleging
among other errors "that the court erred in its rulings in the
pre-trial conference." (This seems to be the first direct challenge
'119 Colo. 203, 201 P. (2d) 905, January 10, 1949.
1121 Colo. 198, 214 P. (2d) 498.
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of its kind in our court.) It appears that during the pre-trial
conference, counsel for defendant had requested the court to re-
quire plaintiff to "advise the court as to the acts of negligence
upon which they (plaintiffs) were proposing to rely." Counsel for
the plaintiffs objected, and stated that the request was not proper,
that it was a matter of proof and that this is a pre-trial confer-
ence to see what can be admitted; that they had alleged negligence,
and defendants had denied it so that is a question that is at issue.
The trial court sustained the plaintiff's objection. During the open-
ing statement by counsel for plaintiffs, for the first time the basis
of the negligence asserted appeared, as counsel stated that plain-
tiffs expected to prove that there was a stop sign at the inter-
section. The Supreme Court held that the failure of the trial court
to direct plaintiffs to state the specific negligence relied upon at
the pre-trial conference was not prejudicial error. In considering
the court's opinion it may well be that the defendants were not
prompt and diligent in using other rules available to them to
ascertain this vital information. It appears at page 207 and the
Supreme Court made note of it that the defendants had not filed
any motion for a bill of particulars, nor employed any other means
to obtain a definite or particular statement of the items of speci-
fic negligence asserted by plaintiff 5 prior to the date set for trial.
Be that as it may, however, the following statement by the court
on page 209 is quite significant as indicating the view of our
Supreme Court:
Further discussion of the failure of the court to
compel plaintiffs to disclose the specific acts of negligence
upon which they relied, and which is the real basis of this
assignment of error, is not necessary other than to say
that the pre-trial conference rule is designed to expedite
trials when certain facts may be admitted and the neces-
sity of proof thereof obviated. The proper courtesy of the
profession enables this to be done, usually in a few mo-
ments at the beginning of a trial, without pre-trial con-
ference. Usually, obvious facts are admitted, but we see
nothing in the rule that is compulsory as to the disclosure
of the details of the issues to be made by the pleadings.
As to whether or not a pre-trial conference is to be called,
rests entirely in the discretion of the trial court and that
discretion abides throughout the procedure.
Naturally, no one can quarrel with the statement that the
calling of the pre-trial conference by the trial judge is discretion-
5 The fate of such a motion, at least in Denver, is well known; as to deposi-
tions, in Morris v. Redak, 124 Colo. 27, 234 P. (2d) 908, the court said at p. 41 that




ary, because the rule says so specifically. However, it would seem
that once the discretion was exercised in favor of holding a pre-
trial conference that the trial court should be able to determine
fairly the real issues to be tried and thus compel a frank disclosure
of the proof, the applicable law and other details as mentioned by
Judge Symes in his article so that the conference would produce
results in accordance with the spirit of the rules. The statement
by counsel for the plaintiff that "this is a pre-trial conference to
see what can be admitted" which apparently was endorsed by the
trial judge, and ultimately approved by the supreme court is far
too narrow and overlooks the other aspects of the rule as stated
expressly by its wording, such as, the simplification of issues,
amendments, etc. The attitude of the Federal Courts is well stated
in Cherney v. Holmes :6
The first stated purpose of the pre-trial conference
under Rule 16, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28
U.S.C.A., is simplification of the issues; another purpose
is to obtain admission of facts and of documents without
further proof at the trial. Attorneys at a pre-trial con-
ference owe a duty to the court and opposing counsel to
make a full and fair disclosure of their views as to what
the real issues at the trial will be. Rule 16 has done much
to eliminate sham and surprise in the preparation and trial
of cases in the federal courts. As was stated in Brown v.
Christman, 75 U.S. App. D. C. 203, 126 F. 2d 625, 631,
one of the results of fair disclosures at a pre-trial confer-
ence is to take cases from the realm of surprise and man-
euvering whereby an unwary counsel might see the just
cause of his client lost.
In American National Insurance Company v. Gregg,7 which
also came up from Pueblo as the Duffy-Gross case did, from the
same trial judge (Honorable J. Arthur Phelps) again the Supreme
Court was called upon to determine whether or not Judge Phelps'
action at the pre-trial conference in refusing to require a plaintiff
to make additional specifications of the claim was right and again
the Supreme Court sustained the trial judge. It appears that this
was an action to recover from an insurance company on a policy
of insurance. The critical question was whether or not the policy
was in force at the time of death, and depended upon the effective
date of the policy. The date of the application for the insurance
was June 27, 1946; the date of the issuance of the policy was August
9, 1946; and the date of delivery, September 10, 1946. The insured
was killed in an airplane accident on March 30, 1947. By arrange-
ment made with agent of the insurance company the premium
I (7th Circuit) 185 F. (2d) 718 at 721.
,123 Colo. 476, 231 P. (2d) 467 (1951).
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was actually paid for the first six months by the agent. The ques-
tion to be determined by the trial judge was whether or not the
policy was in force because of the grace period of 31 days. If it
extended from the date of delivery of the policy it was in force,
otherwise not. Although the rules were in force from April 6, 1941,
and the trial commenced on February 24, 1948, the trial judge
referred to the rules as the "new rules." Although geologically
speaking, perhaps the term of seven years is not long; neverthe-
less, when one considers the amount of litigation which has ensued
in the courts of Colorado in such period it would seem that the
gloss of being "new" had then and certainly now rubbed off. In
Paragraph 4 of Plaintiff's complaint it was averred "That at the
time of the death of William Timothy Gregg all premiums due
and payable on said policy had been paid by one J. Q. Adams,
agent of defendant." Counsel for the company inquired how
plaintiff intended to prove these allegations and by whom. The
answer to this was that she expected to prove the allegations by
herself, one Virgil R. Carter and John Q. Adams, and by the allega-
tions made in the defendant's answer and defendant's motion. The
counsel for the defendant insisted that the plaintiffs state the
specific allegations in defendants answer and motion that they
were relying upon. The trial court ruled that since plaintiff had
given the names of the three witnesses plus the defendant's answer
and motion she had sufficiently answered.
The Supreme Court said at page 483:
We cannot think the court erred, and assuredly de-
fendant could not have been misled by the ruling... Con-
sidering the state of the pleadings, as we think, no mys-
tery attended in the premises. The evidence given by the
witnesses mentioned, and particularly that of the agent
Adams, made certain that which already was clear.
The second error charged by the defendant related to whether
or not the plaintiffs intended to prove the agent had authority to ac-
cept other property pledged in payment of the premiums. The
Supreme Court held, that considering the record and the fact that
the agent had paid the premiums himself, based upon the arrange-
ment with the insured, that this question was not pertinent. This
case, of course, neither helps nor hinders in determining the power
of the trial court under Rule 16, as the answers given certainly
seem sufficient. The opinion was by Judge Hilliard. Mr. Justice
Hays and Mr. Justice Moore concurred. Mr. Justice Alter con-
curred specially. The then Chief Justice, Judge Jackson, Mr. Jus-
tice Stone and Mr. Justice Holland dissented. The ground of dis-
sent is not stated, consequently, we may assume that the pro-
nouncement of the writer of the opinion as to the proceedings at
the pre-trial conference were accepted, and that the real basis of
the dissent was on the legal effect of the opinion as to the effective
date of the policy of the insurance.
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In Light v. Rogers,8 a case involving damages for breach of
contract in connection with the sale of real estate in which the
court applied again the parol evidence rule, decided February 18,
1952, the opinion by Mr. Justice Alter, reference was made to the
pre-trial proceedings without any discussion as to whether or not
the court committed error, and at page 211 of the report:
When the trial began, a question was propounded to
plaintiff on direct examination, to which defendants inter-
posed an objection, whereupon the court ruled:
'As we stated in the pre-trial conference which we
have just concluded, and wherein we entered certain stipu-
lations [no order reciting the action taken at the pre-trial
conference or the stipulations entered into thereat ap-
pear in the record as provided by Rule 16, R.C.P. Colo.],
we are running into a matter of law here upon which
there might be a serious controversy.'
However, it appeared that this question of law was reversed
for the trial, when it could have well been ruled upon at the pre-
trial conference and would have been of decisive effect. I realize,
of course, that the pre-trial conference should not be a substitute
for or held in lieu of the actual trial, but in the interest of attain-
ing the objective stated by the rules it should determine what the
"real issues" are to be tried and if proof offered by a party is not
"legal" proof rulings should be made accordingly.
In McCoy v. District Court of Larimer County,9 the Supreme
Court made original proceedings in the nature of a writ of pro-
hibition absolute against the trial court. This involved the ques-
tion as to whether or not a party who had made a statement to an
investigator shortly after a collision could require his opponent to
submit for inspection such statement. The trial court observed that
the showing made by the party under Rule 34 was not sufficient,
but went on to say:
'However, the motion made was and is in connection
with pre-trial conference, and one purpose of pre-trial
conference is to aid in the disposition of the action, which
may well include, among other discovery mechanisms,
disclosure so that "civil trials need no longer be- carried
on in the dark by either party to them."'
While the Supreme Court held that the trial court could not
compel such disclosure and placed its decision primarily on the
failure of the party seeking inspection to show good cause under
Rule 34, nevertheless, it also disapproved the action of the trial
court in ordering inspection under Rule 16, saying:
125 Colo. 209, 242 P. (2d) 234.
'246 P. (2d) 619, June 23, 1952.
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[2] The district court apparently concluded that
the showing made in the instant case was insufficient-
under Rule 34, R.C.P. Colo.-to justify an order to pro-
duce the documents, but concluded that, since the matter
arose in connection with the pre-trial conference the in-
sufficiency of the showing might be disregarded. In this
conclusion the trial court erred. Rule 16, R.C.P. Colo.,
which provides for a pre-trial conference, does not confer
upon a trial court authority to compel the production of
any documents or force the making of any admissions.
Duffy v. Gross, 121 Colo. 198, 214 P. 2d 498. The only
section of said rule in which documents are specifically
mentioned, is to the effect that the court may order the
attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a con-
ference to consider 'the possibility of obtaining admis-
sions of fact and of documents which will avoid unneces-
sary proof.' If in any case a litigant is entitled to the
production of documents he must bring himself within
the provisions of Rule 34, R.C.P. Colo.
It is noteworthy that Duffy v. Gross is cited as authority and
the court again emphasizes that Rule 16 does not confer upon the
trial court authority to compel or force the making. of any ad-
mission or the disclosure of a position. It would appear that the
channel in which pre-trial conferences may be charted is very
narrow indeed.
In Marsh v. Warren,10 an action for reformation of deeds, the
Supreme Court in reviewing the pre-trial order of the court below,
agreed with counsel for the defendant that the pre-trial order did
not bear the construction placed upon it by counsel for the plain-
tiffs.
Although the rules were adopted effective April 6, 1941, and
thus have been in effect for over twelve years, it possibly would
not be quite fair to take the whole period from April 6, 1941, to
date as a basis for the comparisons set forth hereinafter. Due to
the very nature of the drastic changes made by the rules, the fact
that many actions and proceedings were already on file in which
pleadings and issues were drafted and arrived at under the code
of civil procedure, it is fair to assume that a substantial period of
time elapsed before the full impact of the rules was felt. The fact
that many lawyers opposed the adoption of the rules is well known;
others had a tongue in cheek attitude. Indeed, since their adoption
there have been rumblings and rumors from the court itself that
the rules narrowly escaped rescission. It may, therefore, be in-
teresting to note that commencing with Volume 112 of the Colo-
rado Reports, (January, April and September terms 1944, pub-
lished in 1945) and ending with the last Volume No. 125 (Septem-
"248 P. (2d) 825, September 22, 1952.
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ber 1951, January and April terms 1952) published in 1953, prac-
tically a ten-year period, the court has decided 1,218 cases in-
cluding those disposed of without written opinion. Of these, 164
involve criminal law and 41 industrial commission cases. Estimat-
ing another ten per cent for cases in which no pre-trial conference
was necessary or could be had, such as proceedings in the nature
of special writs, etc., it is probably not unreasonable to conclude
that there were approximately 900 civil cases in which pre-trial
would have been profitable and may, or may not have been held,
depending, of course, on the rule in the District. It is somewhat
startling to note that our court has decided two cases in which
the pre-trial proceedings were directly challenged (but approved)
and in two others have made a reference to it. While I made no
attempt to determine the number of cases decided by our court
since the publication of Volume 125 we do have two additional de-
cisions, one in which the pre-trial procedure was directly ques-
tioned and disapproved and the other in which there was a refer-
ence to it.
On the other hand Rule 15, relating to amendments and sup-
plemental pleadings have been the subject of consideration at
least 27 times, according to Shepherd's Citator for Colorado.
It appears to me as a justifiable conclusion that if no power
is to be confided to the trial court under Rule 16 to compel a full,
frank and fair disclosure of the position of each party to the end
that the issues be simplified, and
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action (Rule 1 C (a))
that the rule ought to be rescinded, because as it now stands under
the decisions of our court, it is just another date on the calendar.
LAYMAN'S LANGUAGE
We learn from an ad on page 108 of the New Yorker maga-
zine for September 19, 1953 that for one dollar it is possible to
buy a book on divorce and marriage laws which "Helps you under-
stand advice of your attorney." Not so amusing are the number
of people who vainly request the Denver Lawyer Referral Service
to refer them to an attorney who can explain advice which they
have already received from another attorney. Even more serious
are the charges of professional misconduct which reach the Griev-
ance Committee of the Bar Association because an attorney failed
to advise a client of delays which might arise in his litigation, or
that a money judgment is not the same as money in a bank or that
payment of an attorney's fee does not insure success in court.
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